This paper examines the recent empirical literature in Islamic banking and finance, highlights the main findings and provides a guide for future research. Early studies focus on the efficiency, production technology and general performance features of Islamic versus conventional banks, whereas more recent work looks at profit and loss-sharing (PLS) behaviour, competition, risks as well as other dimensions such as small business lending and financial inclusion. Apart from key exceptions, the empirical literature suggests no major differences between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of their efficiency, competition and risk features (although small Islamic banks are found to be less risky than their conventional counterparts). There is some evidence that Islamic finance aids inclusion and financial sector development. Results from the empirical finance literature, dominated by studies that focus on the risk/return features of mutual funds, finds that Islamic funds perform as well, if not better, than conventional funds -there is little evidence that they perform worse than standard industry benchmarks. Some recent evidence, however, suggests that Islamic bond (Sukuk) issuance destroys value for shareholders.
Introduction
The key principles underlying Islamic banking and finance -namely the prohibition of Riba (narrowly interpreted as interest) and adherence to other Shariá (Islamic law) requirements -are as ancient as religion itself, although it has only been since the 1960's that banks have offered Islamic financial services. These Shariá compliant services now sum-up to a global industry amounting to around $2 trillion in assets, of which 80% is accounted for by Islamic banks (or Islamic windows of conventional banks), 15% Sukuk (Islamic bonds), 4% Islamic mutual funds and 1%
Takaful (Islamic insurance) (The Economist, 2014) . According to the Islamic Financial Services Board (2013), Iran is the biggest Islamic banking market (accounting for around 40% of global Islamic banking assets) followed by Saudi Arabia (14%), Malaysia (10%) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait (both with 9% shares). There are few countries that have solely Islamic banks -only Iran and Sudan -in the majority of Muslim countries Islamic banks compete head-on with conventional banks. For instance in places such as Saudi Arabia around 35% of banking sector assets are Shariá compliant, figures are lower for UAE (22%), Qatar (20%) and Malaysia (20%). While Islamic banking and financial assets comprise under 1% of total global financial assets (given Credit Suisse's (2013) estimates of world financial assets) it is a sector that has grown faster than conventional (Western) finance since the 2007/8 banking crisis, and this trend is expected to continue into the near future (The Economist, 2014) . In addition to the growth in banking assets there is increasing competition between major financial centres to take the lead in Sukuk issuance and to develop a broader array of Islamic investment products (TheCityUk 2013). In the light of these developments it is timely to provide a review of the extant literature on Islamic banking and finance to highlight the main areas of interest and futures areas for further research.
A Brief History
From the earliest stages in Islamic history, Muslims were able to establish a system without interest for mobilizing resources to finance productive activities and consumer needs. The system worked quite effectively during the heyday of Islamic civilization and for centuries thereafter. According to Goitein (1971) partnership and profit and loss (PLS) sharing and non-interest based borrowing and lending formed the basis of commerce and industry in twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the Mediterranean region. However, the Protestant Reformation in the Western world provided an impetus to intellectual growth (Hillebrand, 2009 ). This eventually led to the change in the centre of economic gravity to the West and Western financial institutions (especially banks) became dominant and the Islamic tradition remained dormant. Over the last 50 years or so, however, there has been a revival of interest in developing a modern version of the historic Islamic financial system in the wake of Muslims' desire to stay clear of interest and practice financial transactions consistent with Shariá principles.
When commercial banking emerged after the industrial revolution, Muslim scholars expressed reservations with the Western model of financial intermediation due to its reliance on interest and they called for the development of alternative mechanisms to perform a financial intermediation function in Muslim societies (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005, Molyneux and Iqbal, 2005) . Muslims to a significant extent refrained from dealing with commercial banks. However, the growing needs of traders, industrialists and other entrepreneurs in rapidly monetizing economies were pressing and as a consequence Muslim economists and bankers took up the challenge of developing alternative models of financial intermediation. In the early 19 th century most of the Muslim world was under colonial rule. When many of these countries gained their independence after World War II, practical experiments in interest-free financing started at a modest scale and gradually expanded in scope.
While credit societies and cooperatives working on an interest-free basis existed in several Muslim countries even during the colonial period, the semblance of banking institutions started emerging in the early 1960s. A pioneering experiment of putting Islamic principles governing financial dealings into practice was conducted in Mit-Ghamr, Egypt, from 1963 -1967 . Modelled on the German saving banks (Sparkassen), the Mit-Gamar initiative mobilized small savings from the rural sector largely through savings accounts. No interest was paid to account holders. However, as an incentive they were eligible for small short-term interest-free loans for productive purposes. Account holders were allowed to withdraw their deposits on demand. In addition, investment accounts on the basis of profit and loss sharing were also introduced. The funds so mobilized were invested on the basis of PLS with entrepreneurs.
The first interest-free institution with "bank" in its name, Nasser Social Bank, was established in Egypt in 1971. This was the first time a government in a Muslim country provided public support for incorporating an interest-free institution. Even though the objectives of the Nasser Social Bank were mainly social, such as providing interest-free loans to the poor and needy; scholarships to students; and micro-credits to small projects on a PLS basis; the involvement of a public authority in interest-free banking sent important signals to Muslim businessmen having surplus funds. A group of such businessmen established the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975. This was the first Islamic Bank established on private initiative. However, official support was crucial with the governments of UAE and Kuwait contributing respectively 20% and 10% of the capital. Probably one of the most important developments in the history of Islamic banking took place with the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 1975. The IDB was established as an international financial institution by representatives of member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (in 1975 there were 23 members increasing to 57 by 2014). The IDBs main objective is to promote economic and social development in the Muslim world in accordance with the principles of Shariá and it has been a major financier and promoter of an array of Islamic banking and finance initiatives since its formation.
Between 1975 and 1990 the Islamic financial industry developed into an alternative model of financial intermediation. The period was marked by establishment of a substantial number of Islamic financial institutions in the private sector. In addition, governments in three countries, namely, Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, expressed the desire to gradually eliminate interest from their entire economies and substitute it with banking systems based entirely on Islamic principles -by 2014 Iran and Sudan had (virtually) achieved these objectives. Even more important was the fact that several multinational banks started offering Islamic financial products. This was a clear recognition of the viability of the new model and its acceptance by international players. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank also recognized Islamic financial products as alternative means of financial intermediation (Sundararajan and Errico 2002; World Bank, 2013) . During the 1990s, while growth in the Islamic banking industry continued, attention was also given to the development of non-bank financial institutions. Islamic financial institutions other than banks started coming on the scene in increasing numbers. These included insurance companies and investment funds although (as noted earlier) the bulk of Islamic financial assets (80%) are in banking business.
Initiatives for the establishment of some of infrastructure institutions supporting the Islamic financial industry also started in the 1990s. In the beginning, Islamic banking institutions had to work within the institutional framework that supported conventional banking and they were at somewhat of a comparative disadvantage because the institutional framework was not specifically geared to Islamic needs. While still in its infancy, a beginning was made towards constructing a network of supporting institutions for the Islamic financial industry.
Nowadays Islamic banking and finance manifests itself in five ways: 
Principles of Islamic Banking & Finance
Islamic banking and finance is based on Shariá principles which forbid payment or receipt of Riba generally misconstrued as interest (Pryor, 2007) . i The lending facility encouraged in the medieval era of Islamic society is that of gratuitous loans termed as Qard Al-Hasan. It is interesting to note that Shariá recognizes the time value of money, since according to Islamic rules the price of a good to be sold on a deferred payment basis can be different from its current value. ii While Shariá recognizes excessive payments in business transactions, it prohibits the same on lending activities (Obaidullah, 2005) . Islamic finance has evolved based on the It has been suggested that because of the prohibition of interest and the PLS nature of Islamic banking and finance contracts this can make Islamic financing agreements more complex and costly. Generally, in debt-based or lease-based finance, such as Murabaha, Islamic banks arrange for the goods/projects to be purchased and then sell or rent them (at a mark-up) to clients. For purchase/implementation of the goods/projects, Islamic banks normally appoint the client as their agent. Such a framework is somewhat complicated as compared to conventional loan contracts.
Sundarajan and Errico (2002) note the specific risks attached to various Non-PLS methods, such as Salam and Ijara. In the former, Islamic banks are exposed to both credit and commodity price risks; in the latter, unlike conventional lease contracts, Islamic banks cannot transfer ownership and therefore have to bear all the risks until the end of the lease period.
Another area of debate relates to the treatment of default penalties. Some jurisdictions rule that such penalties are not authorized by Shariá, so banks make use of rebates instead (Khan and Ahmed, 2001) . Here the mark-up on the finance arrangement implicitly covers the return to the banks as well as a default penalty component. If the client repays the loan in a timely manner then they will receive the rebate. While default interest payments are typically calculated over the delayed period in conventional banking, some Islamic banks collect the delayed penalty over the whole financing period. In addition, Islamic banks can also face restrictions regarding the use of derivatives as well as different types of collateral, for instance, they are not authorized to use interest-based assets, like money market instruments or bonds, for security.
In addition to lending, conventional banks also allocate a part of their funds to investments. Such investments normally include purchase of bonds (as well as instruments with shorter maturities) of different types that have risk/return features that help manage portfolio risk. Islamic banks have limited options for such investments since they are not authorized to invest in interest bearing instruments.
Alternatively they can invest in Islamic bonds, known as Sukuk. Although (like in short-term Islamic money markets) the asset class still remains relatively underdeveloped, limitations on Islamic bank investment opportunities has been weakened over time due to Haraam purifcation as well as the expansion of alternative Islamic financing instruments. There is evidence to suggest that Islamic banks typically do not depend on PLS contracts to undertake their financing activities. Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) show that Islamic banks mainly use Non-PLS instruments to avoid moral hazard problem associated with PLS financing. Chong and Liu (2009) (2012) also use an event study approach to look at the 'Ramadan effect' -they find that stock returns are higher and less volatile than during the rest of the year. They say, 'Ramadan positively affects investor psychology, as it promotes feelings of solidarity and social identity among Muslims world-wide, leading to optimistic beliefs that extend to investment decisions'(p.835). Table 4 provides a summary of the recent empirical finance literature.
Performance of Islamic versus Conventional Banks

<Table 4 Empirical Evidence from Islamic Finance HERE>
Conclusion and Future Research
An extensive empirical literature has emerged over the last decade or so investigating Islamic banking and financial issues. The main finding from this body of works is that Islamic banks are at least as efficient and (particularly for smaller banks) have lower default / insolvency risk than their conventional counterparts. Islamic banks typically focus more on higher margin small business borrowers who are less likely to default. Evidence on market power issues is mixed although there is some evidence that Islamic banks can be more competitive than their conventional counterparts. Other (albeit somewhat limited evidence) suggest that the spread of Islamic banking can aid financial inclusion and economic development. Results from the empirical finance literature, dominated by studies that focus on the risk/return features of mutual funds, finds that Islamic funds generally perform the same or better than conventional funds -there is little evidence that they perform worse than standard industry benchmarks. However, there is some evidence that Sukuk issuance destroys value for shareholders. In the context of the recent subprime crisis, Riba can be construed as "toxic" debt that can infect institutions thus impinging on both the real and financial sectors of the economy ii This legality or permissibility is deduced from the precedence of Prophet Muhammad and his companions. It is also rationalized by religious scholars as emanating from the Qur'ānic verse (2: 275): "God has permitted trade (implying credit sales) and forbidden Riba (implying financial facilities with embedded agency issues). The ramification of this precedence has not been understood from a financial economics perspective until recently. This is explicated by Sen (1998, p. 435) as follows: "when financial markets are imperfect (as in the medieval era of the Prophet and his companions), a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred payment plans."
iii From a financial economics perspective "Gharar" can be construed as the following. One, it involves market manipulation ensuing from asymmetric information (Thomas, 1995) . This definition is consistent with the views of Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) and has credence in the light of the recent market manipulating scandals such as LIBOR fixing, Gold price fixing etc.
(http://www.ft.com/indepth/libor-scandal, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324077704578358381575462340). Two, it involves "trading in risk" (El-Gamal, 2009 ). This view is consistent with that of Claessens et al. (2012) . iv Shariá screening has been found to tilt a portfolio towards 'growth' stocks with the exclusion of value stocks. This leads to a style bias impacting on the long term performance of the portfolio (Ebrahim et al, 2014b ). 
